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Consent Searches and
Voluntariness: An Analysis of
Maryland Cases
by David Carey

The search warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment I is the individual's primary protection against constitutionally
proscribed unreasonable searches and seizures. However, one is not entitled to the
protection of the fourth amendment when
he has waived his right to its protection;
such is the case with a "consent search,"2
which occurs when one waives his or her
expectation of privacy with respect to the
place searched.3 In order for a consent
search to be valid, the prosecution must
prove that the consent to search was voluntarily given .. Establishing voluntariness
based on the decisions of the Maryland
courts of appeal is the topic of this article.
Through an analysis of the relevant
Supreme Court and Maryland decisions, a
rough road map emerges that can assist an
attorney in attacking a case in which the
voluntariness of a consent to search is at
issue.
L The Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court's first close scrutiny
of the voluntariness aspect of the consent
search was in Bumper 'V. North Carolina, S
in which police had secured a search warrant to search the house where the defendant lived with his grandmother. When
police told the woman they had a search
warrant, she allowed them to search. The
prosecution did not rely on the warrant at
trial, but on the consent of the defendant's
grandmother. The Court ruled the consent
was not voluntary, holding that "[w]hen a
prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has
the burden of proving that the consent was
in fact freely and voluntarily given. This
burden cannot be discharged by showing
no more than acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority."6

The question of how the prosecution
demonstrates that a consent was "freely
and voluntarily given" was placed squarely
before the Supreme Court in Schneckloth
'V. Bustamante.? Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, rejected the argument that
the police must advise an individual of the
right to refuse to consent to a search, just
as a police officer must warn an individual
of the right to remain silent during a custodial interrogation, 8 because "it would be
impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an
effective warning."9 The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the test
for voluntariness should be the one applied
in Johnson 'V. Zerbst, 10 that of "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or
privilege."11 This "knowing and intelligent" standard, Justice Stewart stated,
applies to those rights which the Constitution guarantees in order to preserve a fair
trial,12 e.g., waiver of the right to counsel
in a federal criminal trial,13 waiver of right
to a jury trial,14 waiver of the right to a
speedy trial. IS "The protections of the
fourth amendment are of a wholly different order and have nothing to do
whatever with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial."16
Thus, the Court reasoned, there is no need
to impose on the prosecution the heightened burden of proving that the waiver was
"knowing and intelligent." Rather, voluntariness should be determined by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual
consent in order to ascertain "whether in
fact it was voluntary or coerced."17 Significantly, knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is merely one of the factors to be
taken into account, along with the age,
intelligence and emotional state of the subject, the behavior of the police, etc.

No single factor will ipso focto make the
consent valid or invalid. 18 Rather, the "totality of the circumstances"19 should be
analyzed in full.
Because this analysis emphasizes an
examination of all the relevant circumstances, factors rarely occur in isolation. Most cases involve the weighing of
different factors, some pointing to voluntariness, others toward a finding or coercion. Not all factors are weighed evenly.
The court will sift the unique facts and circumstances of each case2° and assign a
weight to each factor depending upon its
significance in that particular case. Since
each factor is analyzed completely within
the context of the case in which it appears,
one cannot attach a precise value to a particular factor for all cases. However, in
cases before the Maryland courts, certain
factors are consistenly given primary
importance in the overall totality of the
circumstances analysis, while other factors
are consistently of lesser, or secondary,
importance. Knowing which factors are
considered primary and which are considered secondary in the overall evaluation
of voluntariness will allow an attorney to
more effectively present his or her case to
the court and give the attorney a better
idea of the likelihood of success in a particular case.
ll_ Factors Tending to Show Coercion in
Maryland
Judging by the decisions of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland and Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, the prosecution
more often than not meets its burden of
proving a consent voluntary. However, in
those cases where the prosecution does
not, it is because the defence has presented
evidence that one or more primary factors
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affected the defendant's decision to consent to the search. Three primary factors
that show coercion can be identified from
the decisions of the Maryland courts of
appeal: (1) intimidation of the defendant,
either physical or psychological, by a law
enforcement officer; (2) an invalid claim of
lawful authority by an officer; and (3)
prior illegal police activity leading to a
consent.
A. Intimidation
The first of these factors was present in
Johnson v. State,21 in which the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland invalidated a
consent that it found was based on sheer
physical intimidation. In this case, the
defendant and an associate left the defendant's apartment and drove off in the
defendant's car. They were followed by
police at least two unmarked cars, one of
which pulled next to them at a red traffic
light. Two plainclothes officers approached the car with shotguns drawn and did
not announce that they were police officers. The defendant accelerated through
the red light, while another police car
apprehended them fifty yards down the
road. The defendant and his associate were
taken from the car, forced to assume a
spread eagle position, and searched. The
search revealed narcotics in the car and on
the defendant's person. The defendant's
hands were manacled behind him and he
was put in the back seat of the police car.
Three or four police officers were in the
car with him while other uniformed officers remained outside. Within. fifteen
minutes of the arrest, the defendant verbally consented to a search of his apartment.
Thirty-five to forty minutes later, the
defendant signed a "consent-to-search"
form. His hands were uncuffed to allow
him to sign the form and then recuffed.
The police advised him that if narcotics
were found, charges would be brought
against him, and that he had a right not to
consent.
The court found that the physical intimidation present in this case was substantial
enough to show that the consent was
coerced. Although factors that favor
voluntariness were present, the court
found that the physical intimidation was
substantial enough to render the consent
coerced. Citing "the melodramatic atmosphere of Johnson's midnight apprehension
at gunpoint, followed by his confinement
to the back seat of a police car with his
hands manacled behind his back,"22 the
court stated that "[i]t is hard to imagine a
more coercive atmosphere than appears
from the facts of the instant case."n
In Whitman v. State, 24 the intimidation
was psychological, not physical, but the
court nevertheless found that the consent

was coerced. The defendant was a truck
driver suspected to be transporting illegal
unstamped cigarettes. He was arrested
shortly after midnight without probable
cause, given is Miranda warnings and taken
to a State Highway Association (SHA)
barn in a state police car while a police
officer drove his truck there. The defendant was twenty-three years old, had a

CTTlhe prosecution
more often than not
meets its burden of
proving a consent
voluntary"

tenth grade education, and had no prior
criminal involvement. While in custody,
he was treated with civility, was not
handcuffed, was not threatened', could
move around and smoke, and did not
complain of being denied food or drink.
However, he was subjected to questioning
in the SHA barn for ninety minutes by
two state troopers and one assistant state's
attorney. An application for a search
warrant was typed in his presence, a phone
call was made in his presence to a judge
about signing the warrant that was being
typed, the police unequivocally stated that
they could conduct the search whether he
consented or not, and the defendant was
told by police that type would be saved if
he consented. After ninety minutes in
custody, at 2:30 a.m., the defendant
consented to the search.
Although there was no physical
intimidation as in Johnson, the court found
the consent invalid because of the coercive
psychological atmosphere. Despite the fact
that the defendant was treated with
civility, was not cuffed or restrained, was
free to move about and smoke, and was
not threatened at all, the court found that
"the psychological atmosphere was
critically suggestive."25 It is this form of
subtle coercion, the court pointed out,
that the Supreme Court has proscribed.
The lesson articulated by Bumper and
Schneckloth is that the individual
subjected to the search may indeed be
submitting rather than consenting,
even in an atmosphere of relative

cordiality because of the presence of
psychological forces as potent and
effectual in achieving a 'consent' as the
traditional techniques and familiar
instruments of physical 'persuasion.'26
The actions by the officers in this case
were found to be calculated to make the
defendant think that insistence on his
fourth amendment rights would only
delay the inevitable search rather than protect him from unreasonable searches.27
The holding in Jarrell v. State, 28 reinforces this view. Jarrell was legally arrested
after his car was stopped, and a valid automobile exception search was revealed ten
pounds of marijuana. The defendant was
taken to the police station, given his
Miranda warnings, told that his residence
had been secured by placing two officers
each at the front and rear entrances, and
was asked for consent to search the house.
He verbally consented and signed the consent form. At the pre-trial hearing, he
stated that he consented to the search
because one officer had told him that if he
did not consent, his codefendant would be
released. This testimony was not rebutted
by the state. In ruling that the consent was
coerced, the court cited both the unrebutted testimony of the defendant and the
"inherently coercive"29 atmosphere. Relying on Whitman, the court held that the
statement to the defendant that his house
was secured by four officers "was calculated to persuade Jarrell that the seach was
inevitable, with or without consent,"30
and was therefore coerced. If the psychological atmosphere is calculated to make
the defendant think that the issuance of a
warrant will be automatic, then consent is
not a voluntary decision on the part of the
defendant but in acquiescence to the inevitable.
B. Invalid Claim of Lawful Authority
By An Officer
In the recent case of Titow v. State,31 the
court addressed the second of three primary factors showing coercion. The defendant was stopped at an airport on at least
reasonable suspicion if not probable cause,
and was asked to consent to a search of his
luggage. Even though he refused, the officers told him that they were going to seize
the luggage and issue a receipt for it. The
defendant then consented. The court
found it significant that the officers
misrepresented the fourth amendment
rights of the defendant by implying that
they had the authority to search the luggage regardless of whether the defendant
consented or not, because this was not a
correct description of defendant's constitutional options. Had there been probable
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cause, the bag could have been seized, but
the officers would still have been required
to obtain a warrant to search it; if they
could not obtain a warrant, the bag would
have been returned unsearched; had there
been reasonable suspicion, the officers
could only hold the luggage for a limited
period of time for a dog to sniff. The court
held that this was similar to the situation
that the Supreme Court faced in Bumper 'fJ.
North Carolina,32 where the police claimed
to have a valid warrant, except that in
Titow, "the claim of lawful authority that
was effectively communicated to the
appellant-through a combination of
words, actions and selected silence-was
'You may as well consent to the search of
the luggage because we are going to hold it
(and presumably search it) in any event' "33
The court further stated that
[t]he appellant was not only uninformed as to his full constitutional options,
he was, at least by strong implication,
affirmatively misled as to those
options. A significant misrepresentation, by commission or omission, of
the constitutional choices available to
him is a strong circumstance, in the
larger totality of circumstances, militating against the voluntary quality of
the appellant's consent.34
There is a close relationship between
cases of intimidation and cases of acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.35 In
Whitman and Jarrel~ consent was coerced
because the psychological atmosphere was
calculated to make the defendant think
that his refusing consent would be ineffectual. In Titow, the consent was coerced
because the defendant was misled as to his
true constitutional options.
However, it should be noted that the
advice of a police officer, based on his
experience and his analysis of the present
situation, that a warrant will probably be
issued, will not invalidate a consent. As the
court said in Whitman, "the well founded
advice of a law enforcement agent that,
absent consent to search, a warrant can be
obtained does not constitute coercion."36
The key is whether the advice is the product of an officer's reasoned judgment as
to the likelihood of a neutral and detached
magistrate finding probable cause, or is
merely an attempt to induce a defendant
into thinking that refusing consent would
only delay the inevitable, and is not based
on the officer's own judgment as to the
possibility of securing a warrant. As the
above cases suggest, misleading a defendant
as to his true constitutional options in
order to obtain a consent is a strong factor
tending to show coercion.

C. Prior Illegality
The third primary factor in the analysis
of voluntariness is a prior illegal act by the
police. Consent has been found to be
coerced when this factor, along with
others, was present. In Johnson 'fJ. State, 37 a
prior illegal police action was found. The
court ruled that the initial stop of the
defendant's car was without probable
cause, and that probable cause was only
obtained when the defendant subsequently
sped through a red light. Although the
court noted the illegal police action, it was
the physical intimidation that rendered the
consent coerced. In State 'fJ. Wilson, 38 the
police entered the defendant's apartment
based on a valid search warrant for narcotics. While executing the search, an officer copied down the serial numbers of
various pieces of electronic equipment in
the apartment that he thought might be
stolen. The court ruled that this was an
unconstitutional seizure. 39 Upon returning to the police station, the officer learned
that the serial number on a tape recorder
in the defendant's room was the same as
the serial number on one reported stolen
from an apartment in that area. The next
evening the police went to the defendant's
apartment and were let in by his roommates. They spotted the defendant, told
him that stolen property had been
observed in his room the night before by
a uniformed officer, advised the defendant
of his Miranda rights, and asked him to
"relinquish" the tape recorder. He replied
that it was in his room and he led police
officers to it. The court embarked on a
thorough analysis of all the circumstances
surrounding the consent, noting that the
defendant was not in custody, he was in

"fAJn illegal seizure
does not
automatically render
a consent coerced."
his own apartment with his roommates, he
was advised of his Miranda rights, and he
led the police to the tape recorder. The
court ruled that this evidence of
voluntariness was not sufficient to
overcome the prior illegal police seizure
and the order coercive factors. Because the
police were let into the apartment by the
defendant's roommates and because the
officers did not reveal that the search

executed the preViOUS night was
unconstitutional, the defendant could
reasonably have believed that they were
still acting under the authority of the
warrant used the night before. In addition,
the court found it significant that although
the police advised the defendant of his
Miranda rights, they did not advise him of
his right not to consent, and that one
without the other could reasonably have
led him to believe that he did not have the
option of refusing consent. In addition, the
officer's request that he "relinquish" the
recorder may have reinforced the view
that this was a demand that must be
complied with and not a request which
could lawfully be refused.
In its analysis of the totality of the
circumstances, the court paid special
attention to the prior illegal seizure.
Although an illegal seizure "does not automatically render evidence obtained by a
subsequent consent search inadmissible,"40
the court ruled that it will'render a consent
coerced unless the prosecution presents
strong evidence of consent," 4I The evidence in this case was insufficient. Thus,
when a defendant presents evidence that a
prior illegal seizure was a factor in his giving consent, it is likely that the consent
will be ruled coerced, unless rebutted by
the prosecution presenting strong evidence
of voluntariness. This case concerned a
prior illegal seizure; it is unclear whether
this is also true with respect to prior illegal
arrests42 and searches.
III. Factors Tending To Show
Vol untariness
An examination of the cases in which
the prosecution has prevailed in Maryland
reveal two primary factors that show
voluntariness. The first factor is evidence
that, in addition to consenting to a warrantless search, the defendant cooperated
with the police in either executing the
search or in aiding the overall investigation. The second primary factor tending
toward voluntariness is the giving of consent motivated by the belief of the consenting party that the police will not find the
object of the search.
A. Cooperation With The Police
In Lewis 'fJ. State,43 the defendant, who
was not originally a suspect to the murder
of his wife and child, was asked by police
for permission to search his house in order
to "go through personal papers and things
like that". 44 He was going to be out of
town, so he arranged to leave a key to his
home with a neighbor to allow police
access to his house. While the police were
searching, they found a poem that the
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defendant had written that implicated him
in the murder. The court held that the
consent was voluntary because the defendant had indicated a purpose of
cooperating with the police and then
affirmatively made arrangements for the
police to obtain a key during his absence.
This was sufficient to indicate that the consent was voluntary.
A defendant who was in jail argued that
he was coerced into consenting to give hair
and saliva samples in Simms 'fl. State. 45 The
police explained to the defendant that they
wanted the samples and they showed him
how to drop a few drops of saliva on the
paper, which the defendant did. The officer then selected hairs from his head and
cut them off without objection from the
defendant. The defendant had not been
forcibly brought but rather walked from
his cell on request. During the procedure
there were no threats or promises made,
and defendant was standing alone and was
not held or cuffed by the officers. The
court held that the seizure of the hair and
saliva was the product of a voluntary consent.
In A rm'Wood 'fl. State, 46 the police had
arrived at a house intended for surveillance. The suspect came out of the house,
saw the police, and fled. The police yelled,
"Halt," and defendant stopped. They did
not touch him or search him, but they told
him they had information that he had
heroin in his apartment. The defendant
said "You have got me," and said he
would take the officers to where the drugs
were. He led the officers to his third floor
bedroom and pointed out the drugs. The
court cited the defendant's cooperation
with the police in taking them to his room
and the lack of evidence of coercion in
finding the consent voluntary.47
B. Consent Based on Subject's Belief
That Incriminating Evidence Would
Not Be Found
In Humphrey 'fl. State, 48 the police asked
the defendant's wife to consent to a search
of the home of herself and the defendant.
The police told the woman that they were
looking for evidence to be used in the prosecution of the defendant for murder. She
consented to the search and the police
found two revolvers and $150 in cash that
implicated the defendant. The court noted
that the woman was not under the threat
of arrest, that the police used no coercive
tactics, that she was in her own home and
that she had been told that she could refuse
to consent. On the other hand, she had
never experienced arrest or custody, she
had only a tenth grade education, she was
alone with her four young children, and
she became nervous in the officers' pres-

ence. In holding the consent voluntary, the
court took special note of the fact that the
woman testified that she had consented
because she did not believe that a search
would uncover anything incriminating
and that her consent was, in fact, a tactical
decision "to turn suspicion away from
[her husband] by appearing to give the
authorities innocent and wholehearted
cooperation."49
In Logue 'fl. State, 50 the police asked the
defendant's wife if they could search the
house for the defendant. The defendant's
wife went into the house, came back out,
and consented. The police did not find the
defendant, but they did seize clothes of his
that matched a police description. The
court ruled that the consent was voluntary
because the wife knew that the defendant
was not at home and had no reason to
believe that the clothes were incriminating. Her consent was based on her belief
that the police would not find anything to
incriminate her husband.

"[TJhe cumulative
effects of two or more
secondary factors
could render
them. .. one primary
factor."
The court applied the same reasoning in
'fl. State,51 in which the police
requested that the defendant, who was in
custody, consent to a search of his
apartment for tools allegedly stolen from a
garage where he worked. The defendant
consented and the tools were found. At
trial, he argued that the tools were actually
his. The court, citing Humphrey, ruled that
the consent was voluntarily given, that the
defendant did not think that the tools were
incriminating, and that his "willingness to
allow the warrantless search to take place
was basically a tactical decision calculated
'to turn suspicion away from him.' "52

Borgen

IV. Secondary Factors in Maryland
There are many other factors that are
involved in a totality of the circumstances
analysis. The five previously analyzed are
those that the Maryland courts find
especially indicative of whether a consent
was voluntarily given. Other factors are
secondary in importance, meaning that

they are not as significant as the primary
factors but still somewhat influential and
thus worthy of scrutiny as part of the
totality of the circumstances analysis.
A. Knowledge of Fourth
Amendment Rights
Perhaps the most difficult secondary
factor to classify is the knowledge of the
consenting party of his or her right to
refuse consent. In Schneckloth, the Court
stated that this is merely a factor to be
considered, along with others, and the
Maryland courts have followed the
Supreme Court's direction. Some cases
have presented this factor in a context that
renders the subject's knowledge of his or
her rights extremely persuasive, as in
Tito'W, in which police officers
misrepresented the defendant's fourth
amendment rights,53 and Wilson, where
police advised the defendant of his
Miranda rights but did not adivse him of
his right to refuse to consent, thus
implying that no such right existed.54 In
other cases, the court noted that the
subject was either advised of the right to
refuse to consent,55 or was not,56 but this
was not a significant factor. One argument
based on the officers' failure to advise a
defendant of his fourth amendment rights
was rejected in Fidazzo 'fl. StateY The
defendant argued that the Schneckloth
holding applied only to non-custodial
consents, and that a custodial consent is per
se coerced unless the defendant is advised
of his right to refuse consent. The court,
citing United States 'fl. Watson, 58 stated that
a "per se rule demanding a warning as a sine
qua non is not called for under the fourth
amendment, even where custody IS
involved."59
B. Written Evidence of Consent
Another secondary factor that courts
refer to is whether the consenting party
signed a form consenting to the search.
Although this factor has never been
dispositive, it usually occurs in a case in
which the defendant is aware of his right
to refuse consent, because this notice is
generally given on the consent form, and
can be construed as evidence of
cooperation with the police. Cases in
which
physical
or
psychological
intimidation is at issue may also contain a
signed consent form. Thus, a signed
consent form has been held to be a factor
both in cases ruling that the consent was
voluntary60 and those finding the consent
coerced.61
Although not likely to be the deciding
factor in settling the voluntariness issue,
secondary
factors
are
nonetheless
important. Maryland case law has
specifically stated that they are to be
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considered, and in cases where they are no
primary factors, they gain added significance. Moreover, the cumulative effect of
two or more secondary factors could
render them as important as one primary
factor.
IV. Potentially Relevant Factors in
Maryland
There are other factors that are potentially relevant which have not yet
appeared in a case in which they play a
critical role. For example, the age, education, and familiarity with the criminal
justice system of the consenting party,
which has played a major role in many
third party consent cases and are indeed
mentioned in the analysis of consent
search cases, have not yet been cited as
controlling in any Maryland cases. Courts
have taken notice of these factors,62 but
they have not significantly affected the
outcome of a case in Maryland. Thus, factors such as age and education should be
considered when preparing a case for trial,
because they may be highly relevant.
Another potentially relevant factor has
been addressed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, but not completely enough to
indicate whether it is of any true significance. In Carter 'D. State, 63 the defendant
argued that because he had a prior narcotice conviction that he could not have
freely consented to a search of his car that
turned up narcotics. The court, in finding
the consent voluntary, said that this is
"only one of the circumstances to be considered by the court in determining" the
validity of the consent.64 The court did not
state if, or to what degree, this factor was
significant.
Whether the defendant is in custody
when consenting to a search is another
potentially relevant factor. 65 Like the
other potentially relevant factors, the
courts have mentioned custody as part of
the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed, but have said little more.
Rejected Factors In Maryland
The only factor that has been explicitly
rejected in Maryland as not relevant is
deception by a police officer as to identity.
In Killie '(.I. State, 66 an undercover state
trooper did not reveal his true identity to
the defendant, who invited him to his
home. While there, the officer witnessed
drug use by the defendant. The defendant
argued that the consent given to the police
officer to enter the house was per se involuntary, because it was gained by subterfuge. The court, recognizing the need for
undercover work, rejected this argument
and ruled that the defendant's reading of
the fourth amendment was overbroad.

Thus, deception by an officer as to identity
when performing valid undercover work
is not a factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.

V. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of Maryland
decisions shows that determining whether
a consent to search was voluntarily given
can be a complex matter, because any
number or combination of factors may be
involved and the weight given to a particular factor may change from case to case.
However, looking at these cases collectiv~
ly a certain hierarchy emerges, certain
enough that particular factors can be identified and roughly labeled as either primary, secondary or potential factors.
Attacking a voluntariness issue in a consent search case based on Maryland law is
even more difficult because of the relativ~
ly small number of cases on this issue that
have been decided. Indeed, an attorney faced with such a case is advised to turn to
other jurisdictions where many more cases
of this type have been litigated.67 However, as helpful as a factually similar case may
be, it is important not to lose sight of the
fact that this is a totality of the circumstances test, and that what is most
important is not what one particular court
has already said, but what all the circumstances of the case at hand indicate. It
is in conjunction with a thorough analysis
of the facts of a particular case that this
analysis of what the Maryland courts have
already said is most useful.
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good health todayl

~AMERICAN
CANCER
• SOCIETY'
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38279 Md. 189,367 A.2d 1223 (19n).
39But see Arizona'll. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987).
4°279 Md. at 203.04, 367 A.2d at 1232.
41Id. at 204, 367 A.2d at 1232.
42See Armwood'll. State, 229 Md. 565, 569,
185 A.2d 357, 358 (1962) ("it is well established in this State that the fact that an
arrest was illegal does not make a subsequent search unlawful and the evidence
obtained thereby inadmissible if the accused voluntarily consented to the search").
43285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979).
44Jd. at 719, 404 A.2d at 1080.
45 4 Md. App. 160,242 A.2d 185 (1968).
46229 Md. 565, 185 A.2d 357 (1962).
47For other examples of cases in which
cooperation led to a finding of voluntariness, see Combs'll. State, 237 Md. 428,
206 A.2d 718 (1965); Anderson 'll. State, 237
Md. 45, 205 A.2d 281 (1964); Dougher'll.
State, 236 Md. 629, 204 A.2d 324 (1964);
.McCray'll. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320
(1964); Hall'll. State, 232 Md. 588, 194 A.2d
801 (1963); Sessoms'll. State, 3 Md. App.
293, 239 A.2d 118 (1968).
48 39 Md. App. 484, 386 A.2d 1238 (1978).
49Id. at 490, 386 A.2d at 1242 (quoting
United States'll. Curiale, 414 F.2d 744, 747
(2d. Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969».
This was a valid third party consent
search, which is beyond the scope of this
paper. It does not matter whether it is a
first person or third person consent search.
For this factor, it matters only that a person with authority to consent gives the
consent believing that no incriminating
evidence will be found.
5°282 Md. 625, 386 A.2d 780 (1978).
51 58 Md. App. 61, 472 A.2d 114 (1984).
52Id. at 81, 472 A.2d at 124. See also Ward
'll. State, 52 Md. App. 664, 451 A.2d 1243
(1982) (relying on Humphrey in holding
the consent to search the automobile
trunk was voluntary when the defendant
thought police would not find incriminating evidence).
53See text accompanying notes 31-36.
54See text accompanying notes 38-41.
55SeeJohnson'll. State, 30 Md. App. 280, 352
A.2d 349 (1976) (consent found to be
coerced because of physical intimidation,
although the defendant was advised of his
right not to consent); see also Humphrey'll.
State, 39 Md. App. 383, 490, 386 A.2d
1238, 1242 (1978) (although the consent
was ruled voluntary because of the defendant's wife's cooperation with police, the
court stated that "while not controlling,"
that the subject knew of her right to refuse
consent was significant).
56See Simms'll. State, 4 Md. App. 160, 242
A.2d 185 (1968) (consent ruled voluntary
because of the defendant's cooperation
e~en though he .was not advised of his

right to refuse consent); see also Lopata'll.
State, in which 18 Md. App. 451,307 A.2d
721 (1973), a garage owner consented to a
search of his garage for stolen property
that the defendant allegedly stored there.
The garage owner came to the police station and signed a consent form. The court
ruled that the owner's cooperation in coming to the station to sign the consent form
rendered the failure to warn him of his
right not to consent insignificant. See also
Ricketts'll. State, 46 Md. App. 410,417,417
A.2d 465, 469 (1980), in which the court
ruled the consent voluntary. The fact that
the defendant was not advised of his right
to refuse consent or of the purpose of the
search "are factors to be considered, [but]
they are not controlling."
5732 Md. App. 590, 363 A.2d 583 (1976).
58 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (holding that custodial consent to search was voluntary even
though the defendant was not advised of
his right to refuse consent) .
59Fidazzo, 32 Md. App. at 592, 363 A.2d at
584.
6°ln Borgen'll. State, 58 Md. App. 61, 83,
472 A.2d 114, 126 (1984) the court stated
that the defendant's signing of a consent
form "cannot be deemed insignificant."
See Lopata'll. State, 18 Md. App. 451, 307
A.2d 721 (1973). Cf. .McCray'll. State, 236
Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964) (consent of the
parents to search of an area where the son
occasionally slept held voluntary even
though they refused to sign a consent
form).
6IJn Jarrell v. State, 36 Md. App. 371, 373
A.2d 975 (19n), Johnson v. State, 30 Md.
App. 280, 352 A.2d 349 (1976) and Whit·
man v. State, 25 Md. App. 428, 336 A.2d
515 (1975), a consent form was signed but
consent was nonetheless found to be coerced. See text accompanying notes 28-30.
62See eg., Whitman v. State, 25 Md. App.
428,336 A.2d 515 (1975) (the court noted
that the defendant's wife who gave consent
was a twenty-three-year-old mother of
four with a tenth grade education who had
never been arrested before or in custody);
Borgen v. State, 58 Md. App. 61,472 A.2d
114 (1984) (the court noted that no evidence was presented that this was the
defendant's first arrest or that he was unfamiliar with the criminal justice system).
63236 Md. 450, 204 A.2d 322 (1964).
64Id. at 453, 204 A.2d at 323.
~
65See, eg., Smith v. State, 62 Md. App. 627,
490 A.2d 1307, (1985) (the court found it
significant that the defendant was not in
custody when he consented to the search);
State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 367 A.2d
1223 (19n) (the court noted that the
defendant was not in custody when he
consented to the search); Humphrey'll.
State, 39 Md. App. 484, 386 A.2d 1238

(1978) (the court noted that the defendant's wife who consented was in her
home and not in custody when she consented to the search).
6614 Md. App. 521, 287 A.2d 319 (1972).
67 A comprehensive analysis of all consent
search cases in the United States can be
found in Lafave's Search and Seizure (2nd·
ed. 1986), to which the reader is especially
directed.
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A defense
against cancer

can be cooked up
in your kitchen.

There is evidence that
diet and cancer are related.
Follow these modifications in
your daily diet to reduce
chances of getting cancer:
1. Eat more high-fiber foods
such as fruits and vegetables
and whole-grain cereals.
2. Include dark green and
deep yellow fruits and vegetables rich in vitamins A and C.
3. Include cabbage, broccoli,
brussels sprouts, kohlrabi and
cauliflower.
4. Be moderate in consumption of salt-cured, smoked, and
nitrite-cured foods.
5. Cut down on total fat intake from animal sources and
fats and oils.
6. Avoid obesity.
7. Be moderate in consumption of alcoholic beverages.
No one faces cancer alone.
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